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Abstract
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rms insiders have private information about the 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ample when short-term earnings are common knowledge while long-term
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and 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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes debt-equity choice when asymmetric information exists be-
tween rmsinsiders and market participants regarding future earnings. Most
existing literature deals with one-dimensional asymmetric information-most fre-
quently concerning the value of the rm. In this approach the solution is typi-
cally a pooling equilibrium where the "bad" type (one with low value) mimics
the "good" type (one with high value) by issuing the same kind of securities.
A "second e¤ort" (additional assumptions) is needed to explain why rms issue
securities that are not a part of the equilibrium.
In the present paper, we analyze a signaling game where private information
is two-dimensional: the insiders have private information about the amounts
and timing of future earnings.1 Asymmetric information about the timing of
earnings may take place because: 1) managers may have private information
about the choice of inventory and depreciation methods, allowance for bad debts,
expensing of research and development, recognition of sales not yet shipped,
estimation of pension liabilities, capitalization of leases and marketing expenses,
delay in maintenance expenditures and delay in production; 2) managers may be
subject to moral hazard problems which a¤ect the intensity and productivity of
their e¤orts over time and; 3) corporations typically employ long-term strategic
planning, giving insiders private information for several years.
We analyze a two-stage investment-nancing model where managers repre-
senting initial shareholders have the choice between debt (short- and long-term)
and equity. When only the total earnings are private information, and the tim-
ing of earnings is common knowledge, the equilibrium is pooling. However,
when both the value of the rm and the timing of earnings is managements
private information a separating equilibrium may exist. The following explains
the main ideas behind the separating equilibrium. First, it is well known that in
a separating equilibrium each nancing strategy is chosen by the worst possible
type of rm for that strategy (from the investors viewpoint).2 Otherwise the
rm will be mimicked by other rms which will benet from the overvaluation
of issued securities. We show that the value of shares depends on the rms total
value and not on the timing of earnings or on the rate of earnings growth; the
value of long-term debt relies on the expected performance in the long term and
the value of short-term debt depends primarily on the expected performance in
the short term. If a rm with a high rate of earnings growth issues long-term
debt it will be mimicked because of high expected long-term performance which
implies a high value of long-term debt respectively. The same holds if the rm
issues equity. Other rms may nd it attractive to mimic this strategy not
necessarily because of the high value of equity but because of the high value of
future claims which the rm will issue in the long term. Thus, if the rm with
1 In a similar spirit, some scholars assume that insiders have private information about the
riskiness of their cash ows. See, for example, the second part of Brennan and Kraus (1987),
Brick, Frierman and Kim (1998), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Giammarino and Neave
(1982).
2Brennan and Kraus (1987).
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a high rate of earnings growth and low short-term earnings respectively tries to
separate itself in equilibrium it would do better to issue claims with the value
depending primarily on short-term expected performance (short-term debt).
The main engine driving the results of the paper is that a separating equi-
librium exists where rms with low rates of earnings growth issue equity. This
equilibrium implies that rms issuing equity have better operating performance
at the moment of issue or in the near future after issue, and that these rms have
lower operating performance in the long run. The long run operating underper-
formance of equity issuing rms has been documented in several studies. This
phenomenon is characterized by Ritter and Welch (2002) as the most contro-
versial area of IPO (initial public o¤ering) research. Whereas only a few studies
support the e¢ cient market point of view, others argue in favor of a behavioral
point of view.3 The superior absolute performance of equity issuing rms imme-
diately after the issue is, to our knowledge, a relatively new theoretical point.4
In contrast to the well-documented fact that rms issuing equity have higher
performance just before the issue, their higher absolute performance immedi-
ately after the issue has not been a major point of empirical research (though
it seems to be consistent with some empirical evidence). According to Jain and
Kini (1994, Figure 1) the operating return on assets is higher for IPO rms in
the rst years after the issue and the operating cash ow on assets is higher
in year "0" (immediately after issue). In Loughran and Ritter (1997) prot
margins are higher in years 0 and +1, although there is di¤erent evidence about
operating returns. In Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997, Table 3) IPO rms
have higher performance in year 0.
The model also generates new predictions which have not been tested in
existing literature. In particular, we study how the following factors a¤ect the
conditions of existence for separating equilibrium: bankruptcy costs (reorgani-
zation costs), the extent of asymmetric information regarding rmsvalues and
the timing of earnings. For example, we argue that the emergence of separating
equilibrium and phenomena such as long-term underperformance of rms issuing
equity are more probable when the extent of asymmetric information regarding
the timing of earnings is relatively large and that regarding total earnings is
relatively small. When the di¤erence between rmstotal values is large enough
a separating equilibrium does not exist because the type with a low total value
will mimic the high value type. On the other hand, a large di¤erence in the
rmsrates of earnings growth contributes to the existence of a separating equi-
librium by making it possible for a rm to design debt claims which will not
be mimicked by other rms. We provide a discussion of possible strategies for
testing this result.
3When speaking about long run performance, Ritter and Welch (2002) incorporate all
aspects of this problem and not specically the afterissuing underperformance of rms that
issue equity, although this aspect is a part of their analysis.
4Most analysts conclude that issuing rms underperform non-issuing rms in the rst few
years after issue. The undeperformance is measured by the performance after issue relative
to the performance in the year before the issue. This does not contradict the fact that these
rms my have higher absolute performance immediately after issue.
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The model in the present paper is closely related to the "pecking-order the-
ory" put forward by Myers and Majluf (1984). They consider a single-stage
investment model in which asymmetric information exists about the value of
both assets in place and the new project.5 While it provides many important
insights into rm behavior under asymmetric information, most notably the un-
derinvestment problem and why rms may prefer internal nancing to external
nancing, it does not explain why rms issue equity. Myers (1984) argues that
when rms have dividend ratio constraints or external debt constraints, they
may issue equity. However, some research demonstrates that rms issue equity
even when they are not nancially constrained (see, for instance, Loughran and
Ritter, 1997).
Lucas and McDonald (1990) also analyze rms incentives to issue equity
under asymmetric information. If a rm requires funding for a project that
has a long-term decision horizon and a delay in accepting the project has low
cost, then an undervalued rm will choose to delay issuing equity until the true
value of the rm is revealed and the share price rises. Thus, the paper explains
why, on average, positive abnormal returns will precede equity issues and why
decreases in stock prices often accompany stock issue announcements while it is
not focused on the correlation between debt and protability and on operating
performance after issue.
Our model is also related to Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) where a
rms managers have long term private information about the rms quality.
This paper focuses on the debt maturity choice. The absence of second-period
investments, together with the assumption that a rmsoverall cash ows are
ordered by rst-order stochastic dominance, precludes any prediction about the
issuance of equity in Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995). In this case, both long
term debt and equity represent claims on the rms total cash ow, and thus
equity is eliminated by the standard pecking order argument (Nachman and
Noe, 1994).
Finally note that our results also compliment Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDon-
ald (1992) where rms choose to issue equity when the extent of asymmetric
information regarding rmsvalues is relatively low. In addition, we show that
rms issue equity when the asymmetry regarding the timing of earnings is rel-
atively high.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a
basic model description. Section 3 analyses the separating equilibria. Section
4 presents the model implications and compares the results with other theo-
ries. Section 5 suggests several extensions of the basic model and discusses the
robustness of its results. The conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
5Recall that in the present paper the investment is two-staged and asymmetric information
exist about earnings from both stages of the investment.
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2 Basic model.
Consider a rm with a two-stage investment project. In each period, indexed
by t = 1; 2, an amount b has to be invested. In each period the project can
either be successful or unsuccessful. There are two types of rms: for rm i the
probability of success in period t equals it and for rm s it is st. The cash
ow of type x = i; s in period t is denoted by rxt. In the case of success rxt = 1,
otherwise rxt = 0. Total expected cash ow for type x over both periods is then
vx = x1 + x2. We assume the s are restricted to the interval (b; 1], which
implies that the investment has positive net present value in each period. Firm
i is "performance-improving" relative to rm s ("stagnating") because
gi  gs (1)
where gx denotes the rate of earnings growth (x2=x1). A rm x has increasing
expected cash ows if gx > 1, and the cash ow prole is at or declining if
gx = 1 or gx < 1 respectively. The rms performance can be described by a
pair (vx, gx) . The probabilities of success in each stage are then:
x1 =
vx
1 + gx
and x2 =
vxgx
1 + gx
(2)
The extent of asymmetric information regarding long-term cash ows is
greater than or equal to that of short-term cash ows:
ji1   s1j  ji2   s2j (3)
Short-term performance may be signicantly related to the rms past activities
which may be known to the public while long-term performance relies more
heavily on new decisions.
The rms prot is observable and veriable. There exists universal risk-
neutrality and perfect competition among investors. This implies zero market
prot and risk-neutral valuation for any security issued.
2.1 Financing strategies
In the rst period the rm x = i; s may issue equity (denote this strategy by e),
short-term (d) or long-term debt (l).6
Equity nancing. In the rst period the rm issues nx shares for the price
p such that the amount of nancing covers the investment needs: pnx = b
where p denotes the market price of shares. After observing the rst-period
cash ow rx1 the rm may distribute dividends D
rx1
x1 or may use funds f
rx1
x to
nance the second stage internally: rx1 = D
rx1
x1 + f
rx1
x .
7 In the second period
6 In Section 5, we consider a model extension with mixed nancing as well as other exten-
sions.
7Theoretically the rm can also keep cash until the second period. However, this scenario
never appears in equilibrium and thus it is excluded for simplicity. We consider the scenario
with dividend covenants where the rm must keep some cash later.
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rms do not nance with equity.8 Hence, in the second period, the rm has the
choice between internal nancing and debt (the amount of debt equals b frx1x ).
Denote the second-period debt face value by F rx12 . The second-period cash ow
rx2 is distributed, in total, to the claimholders.
Short-term debt. The rm issues debt with face value F1 which matures at
t = 1. If rx1 = 0 (default) then two situations are possible. If V2  F1 (where
V2 is the rms going concern value expected by investors) then the rm will
rollover the existing debt by issuing a new claim with a real value equal to F1
(Diamond (1991), Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995)). If V2 < F1 then the
creditors can get control over the rm. If control passes to the creditors, the
second-period value of the rm is V c2 = V2, where  2 [0; 1].  may have two
interpretations. First, it may mean that there are bankruptcy or reorganization
costs. An alternative interpretation is that the entrepreneur has a superior
ability to run the rm and its replacement reduces the rms value. To avoid
a social loss when  < 1 the rm can continue operating under the control of
the initial shareholders. This decision depends on the renegotiation between the
entrepreneur and the creditors. The renegotiation is conducted in the following
manner: the entrepreneur makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er to the creditors to
exchange their existing claims for new claims with face value F r which mature
in t = 2.9 The creditors may accept or reject the o¤er. If the o¤er is rejected
the creditors get the rms equity and the shareholders get nothing.
Long-term debt. Long-term debt has face value F2 and matures in t = 2. It
can be senior or junior. If it is senior then any new claim issued in the second
period will be subordinated and vice versa. When long-term debt is junior, the
rm is always able to raise funds for nancing the second stage when internal
funds are insu¢ cient. However, if the rms expected cash ow in the second
stage is low and debt is senior, the rm may be not able to raise funds to
nance the second stage. This may create a debt overhang problem. Since this
leads to ine¢ ciency, the parties may renegotiate at the end of the rst period.
We continue to assume that shareholders make take-or leave-it o¤er to the
creditors.
The rms type is revealed to the entrepreneur in period 0 while nancing and
investments take place in periods 1 and 2. The rms initial capital structure is
100% equity, with n shares outstanding. Let xt denote the proportion of equity
owned by the entrepreneur in period t (immediately after the issue of securities
in period t, if it takes place). Clearly, x0 = 1. The second-period nancial
outsiders observe the rst-period capital structure choice and rst-period cash
ow. Throughout this article, we use the concept of Perfect-Bayesian equilibria.
For our purposes it will be suitable to present a set of exogenous parameters
8This is based on Myers and Majlufs (1984) result that in a one-stage investment setting
equity is never issued under asymmetric information.
9Under an alternative scenario the parties may divide the surplus from continuation in the
proportion 50-50 (Nash solution) or in other proportions. This will not change the model
results as long as the value of the rm under the creditors control is related to the rm value
under the shareholders control. See Giammarino (1989) for di¤erent defaults scenarios under
asymmetric information.
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describing the model as (vi; gi; vs; gs; b; ). In the next section we will analyze
the parameter values under which a separating equilibrium may exist.
3 Separating equilibria.
When the extent of asymmetric information regarding rmstotal values is large,
a separating equilibrium does not exist: the type with low value mimics that
with high value. When the extent of asymmetric information regarding rms
total values is relatively small and that concerning the timing of earnings is
relatively large, a separating equilibrium may exist. In this case, i has lower
performance in the rst period and higher performance in the second period.
In such an environment, prices can be a¤ected by the lemon e¤ect in both
periods. Intuitively, i has a "lemon" advantage in the rst period: with lower
prots in this period, i can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the
other hand, in the second period the "lemon" advantage passes to s. i and s
face very di¤erent incentives regarding nancial decisions. The point is that the
price of rst-period equity depends on the rmstotal values and it does not on
the timing of cash ows. As a result, if i were to issue equity in the rst period,
it cannot benet from its "lemon" advantage in the rst period (given that the
di¤erence between rmstotal values is low enough). Thus, i would always be
mimicked by s, who stands to gain in the second period by being perceived
as growing and, therefore, as expecting high prots in the second period. The
implication is that i is at a disadvantage for issuing equity in the rst period.
To signal its type, i can issue debt. In particular, if the cost of bankruptcy is
high enough, rst-period interest rates will be relatively high compared to those
of the second period (since i is considered badin the rst period and good
in the second). Given such an interest rate prole, we show that if s plays debt,
it will be benecial to creditors, but not to the rm. This is because creditors
benet from the high interest rates in the rst period and the fact that s does
well in that period. In what follows we develop these ideas.
Let V jkm  V j(vk; gk; vm; gm; b; ) be the expected payo¤ to the entrepreneur
of type k (with total value vk and rate of growth gk) if the strategy j; j 2 fe; d; lg
is played and the type is perceived by the market as typem (with the parameters
vm and gm), k;m 2 fi; sg. A separating equilibrium is a situation where type i
plays strategy j1, type s plays strategy j2 and no type has an incentive to mimic
the other type:
V j2is  V j1ii and V j1si  V j2ss (4)
It is thus clear that the analysis of the V jkm function is crucial. The value of
V jkm depends on the performance of type k and the prices of issued securities.
The latter are equal to the symmetric information prices for type m which will
be marked with subscript m, for instance the symmetric information share price
for type m is pm and the face value of short-term debt is Fm1. We have:
V ekm = k1Erk1 [D
rk1
k1 + Erk2D
rk1rk2
k2 ]
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where k1 = nn+nk =
n
n+b=pm
denotes the fraction of equity retained by the
entrepreneur after issuing shares and Erk1 [D
rk1
k1 + Erk2D
rk1rk2
k2 ] denotes the ex-
pected dividends in periods 1 and 2.
Erk1D
rk1
k1 = k1(1  f1k )
Erk1rk2D
rk1rk2
k2 = k1k2(1  F 1m2) + (1  k1)k2(1  F 0m2)
Given i performs better than s in the second period, i will always use internal
nancing in the second period if available in order to avoid the lemon problem.
In contrast, s pays out as much cash in dividends as possible and uses external
nancing. This is quite intuitive and thus formal proof is omitted for brevity.
Finally, we have
V ekm = k1[k1(1  f1k + k2(1  F 1m2)) + (1  k1)k2(1  F 0m2)] (5)
Let us turn to strategy d. Consider rk1 = 0. If V2  Fm1 , where V2 = m2   b,
the rm will issue a new claim which matures in t = 2 with the face value
equal to F rm and with the real value equal to Fm1: F
r
m = Fm1=m2. This claim
will be sold for Fm1 (recall that the creditors perceive the rm as type m)
and the proceeds from this issue will be used to pay o¤ the existing debt. If
m2   b < Fm1 then the shareholders will o¤er the creditors a fraction  of the
rms equity (it can be a new debt claim). This o¤er will be accepted because
it provides the highest value (in case the rm is m the value of equity o¤ered
to the creditors equals (m2   b)) the creditors can get through bankruptcy
and getting control over the rm (according to their equilibrium beliefs about
the rms type). If the fraction of equity o¤ered to the creditors is less than
 the creditors will reject the o¤er. In this case the shareholders get nothing
and thus they have no interest to do so. To summarize, we get the following. If
m2   b < Fm1 then
V dkm = k1(1  Fm1   f1k + k2(1  F 1m2)) + (1  )(1  k1)k2(1  F 0m2) (6)
and otherwise
V dkm = k1(1  Fm1   f1k + k2(1  F 1m2)) + (1  k1)k2(1  F rm   F 0m2) (7)
where F rm = Fm1=m2.
Similarly for strategy l we get the following. If 1  Fm2 + F 0m2
V lkm = k1(1  f1k + k2(1  Fm2   F 1m2)) + (1  k1)k2(1  Fm2   F 0m2) (8)
The case 1 < Fm2+F 0m2 never appears in equilibrium as shown in the Appendix
(proof of Lemma 1).
The following lemma determines the prices of issued securities under sym-
metric information that that are necessary for the analysis of the V jkm function.
Lemma 1. If information is symmetric then for type x = i; s :
px = (x1 + x2   2b)=n = (vx   2b)=n (9)
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Fx1 =
 b (1 x1)(x2 b)
x1
; x2 < 2b
b; x2  2b (10)
F rx1x2 = (b  frx1x )=x2 (11)
F rx = b=x2 (12)
Financing with long-term debt is only possible if x2  2b and
Fx2 = b=x2 (13)
(Proofs of all lemmas and propositions are collected in the Appendix)
As one can see from Lemma 1 the values of di¤erent securities depend in
di¤erent ways on the rms expected performance in each period. Since each
type performs di¤erently in each period the value of securities issued by di¤erent
types are di¤erent. To avoid mimicking, rms will issue securities which have
a lower value compared to the other type. In this sense the following remarks
about Lemma 1 are useful. Equation (9) implies that px depends only on the
rms total prot and not on its prot prole over time. Total expected cash
ow equals x1 + x2. Total investment is 2b. Total expected earnings are thus
x1 + x2   2b which implies (9).
If x2 is su¢ ciently high (x2  2b) then short-term debt is risk-free because
the rm can rollover this debt if rx1 = 0 (a similar situation occurs in, for
instance, Flannery, 1986). If x2 < 2b then as follows from (10), the short-term
debt face value is positively linked to the amount of borrowing and negatively
related to both the expected performance in the rst- and second-periods and to
the reorganization costs.
For long-term debt, if x2  2b the value of debt depends only on the expected
second-period performance. The rm cannot default in the rst period (it does
not matter whether the debt is senior or not) and all rst-period earnings will be
distributed to the shareholders. This is because internal nancing in the second
period increases the value of the creditors claim and reduces the shareholders
value. Now when x2 < 2b nancing with long-term debt is impossible regardless
of whether long-term is senior or not (although the explanations are di¤erent in
both of these cases).10
From (11) the second-period debt face value is positively linked to the
amount of external nancing in the second period and negatively related to
both expected second-period performance and retained earnings.
10 If debt is subordinated then the rm will also distribute all dividends to the shareholders
and nance the second stage by borrowing. External investors will agree to provide second-
period nancing because their claim will be senior. When x2 < 2b the expected payo¤ to the
long-term creditors is less than b. If long-term debt is senior and x2 < 2b then in the end
of the rst period the rm will face the debt overhang problem- it will not be able to raise
funds for the second stage. To avoid a debt overhang problem the parties will renegotiate.
The maximum payo¤ the long-term creditors can get in the second period equals the rms
going concern value. Again when x2 < 2b the rms going concern value (x2   2b) is less
than b which in turn implies that the expected payo¤ to the long-term creditors cannot cover
the investment cost.
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It follows from Lemma 1 and the denition of V jkm that V
j
kk = k1 + k2  
2b for any j 2 fe; d; lg. The right side shows the expected payo¤ of type k
under symmetric information: it equals total expected cash ow minus the costs
of investment which is not surprising in this Modigliani-Miller environment.
This can be proven by substituting the prices of securities under symmetric
information into the expressions for V jkm:
Lemma 1 has several implications for the existence of separating equilibrium.
For instance, if i1  s1 or s2  i2 then one type has better performance
than the other in both periods and thus by Lemma 1 any claim issued by this
type has higher value.
Lemma 2. If i1  s1 or s2  i2 a separating equilibrium does not
exist.
Corollary 1. If gi = gs a separating equilibrium does not exist.
It follows from Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 that if the rmsrates of prot
growth are equal or if one type has higher performance in both periods than
the other, a separating equilibrium does not exist: the type with higher value
will always be mimicked. We thus consider the case where the type with higher
rate of earnings growth has lower performance in the rst stage and higher
performance in the second stage than the stagnating type:
i1 < s1 s2 < i2 (14)
gi > gs (15)
vi  vs (16)
The latter follows from (3) and (14).
From (14) rms with high rate of earnings growth have low performance in
the rst period and high performance in the second period relative to "stagnat-
ing" rms. Intuitively, rms with a high rate of earnings growth appear to have
a "lemon" advantage in the rst period: lower prots in this period mean that
this type of rm can capitalize on the adverse selection problem. On the other
hand, in the second period the "lemon" advantage passes to rms with a low
rate of earnings growth.
For our purposes the following denition will be useful. Let Rjkm be the
expected surplus (the di¤erence between the expected equilibrium payo¤ and
the symmetric information payo¤) to the entrepreneur of type k if the strategy
j is played and the type is perceived by the market as the type m. Rjkm =
V jkm   k1   k2 + 2b. Obviously Rjkk = 0 which corresponds to the symmetric
information case. From (4) a separating equilibrium exist if
Rj2is  0 and Rj1si  0 (17)
Lemma 3. @Rjkm=@vm > 0 for any j 2 fe; d; lg.
On the intuitive level Lemma 3 is straightforward: under asymmetric in-
formation a rms expected surplus increases if the market value of the rm
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(the value of the rm from the investors viewpoint) increases. A more intrigu-
ing question is how changes in a rms earnings growth rate a¤ect Rjkm. This
question is at the core of the analysis below.
From (2) an increase in the rate of earnings growth increases the rms
expected performance in the second period. We know, from Lemma 1, that
the price of equity depends on the value of the rm, and not just rst-period
performance. The value of any claim issued by the rm in the second period
depends heavily on the rms second-period expected performance. Hence an
increase in the markets perception of the rms rate of earnings growth increases
the expected payo¤ of the rm issuing equity.
Lemma 4. @Rekm=@gm > 0:
Proposition 1. A separating equilibrium where i issues equity does not
exist.
Proposition 1 is based on Lemmas 3 and 4, and on (15) and (16). An
explanation for this result is as follows. Since the price of equity depends on the
value of the rm, and not just rst-period performance, i cannot benet from
its lemon advantage in the rst period. Moreover, i will lose in the second
period because of ss lemonadvantage in this period. While when ri1 = 1,
i can use internal nancing to mitigate the adverse selection problem linked to
external nancing in the second period, this problem is inevitable if ri1 = 0.
This logic also underlines the existence of a separating equilibrium, where i uses
debt nancing and s uses equity nancing.
Consider a separating equilibrium where s plays equity and i plays short-
term debt. This equilibrium exists if and only if the following holds:
Rdsi  0 (18)
Reis  0 (19)
The rst condition is the non-deviation condition for s. The second condition
is the non-deviation condition for i. Applying the above reasoning one can
show that i will not mimic s when the latter issues equity and (19) holds. Now
consider (18). This only holds under some values of the parameters and does
not hold otherwise. If the second-period expected performance of type i is high
enough to cover the cost of investment over both periods (i2  2b) a separating
equilibrium does not exist: s mimics i because s benets from the low face value
of debt in the second period while rst-period debt is risk-free by Lemma 1 and
it does not imply any value loss for s. We thus continue with the case i2 < 2b.
Generally speaking, for i to separate from s, i must issue claims with a value
which depends heavily on rst-period expected performance when i is weak.
Recall that the set of model parameters is (vi; gi; vs; gs; b; ). We will show
that there exists a clear role for every parameter in balancing the weights of
rst-period and second-period expected performances in the value of debt.
Lemma 5. @Rdsi=@ > 0:
The intuition behind Lemma 5 is as follows. If  is low then rst-period
creditors will not signicantly rely on the rms second period performance.
Low  implies high reorganization costs or that it is costly to transfer ownership
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from the shareholders to creditors if the rm defaults in the rst period. Thus
the rms rst-period expected performance becomes crucial in valuing debt.
Since i has low rst-period expected performance, mimicking i is not protable
for s and vice versa. Lemma 5 leads to the following proposition.
Corollary 2. Either Rdsi > 0 for any  or there exists 
 2 [0; 1] such that
Rdsi  0 if and only if   (other parameters being equal).11
Proposition 2. A separating equilibrium where i issues short-term debt and
s issues equity exists if and only if  exists (Corollary 2) and   :
Now consider how changes in vs and gs a¤ect the existence of equilibrium.
Two ideas underline the analysis below. First when the di¤erence between rms
total values is large enough a separating equilibrium does not exist because the
type with a low total value will mimic the high value type. On the other hand, a
large di¤erence in the rmsrates of earnings growth contributes to the existence
of equilibrium by making it possible for i to design debt claims which will not
be mimicked by s.
Lemma 6. 1) Either Rdsi > 0 for any gs (other parameters being equal) or
there exists gs such that R
d
si  0 if and only if gs  gs ; 2) @Rdsi=@vs < 0 and
either Rdsi > 0 for any vs (other parameters being equal) or there exists v

s such
that Rdsi  0 if and only if vs  vs .
Proposition 3. A separating equilibrium where i issues short-term debt and
s issues equity exists if and only if the following holds: 1) gs exists (Lemma 6)
and gs  gs ; 2) vs exists (Lemma 6) and vs  vs .
Proposition 3 follows directly from Lemma 6 and our previous discussion
of this equilibrium (equations (18) and (19)). Similarly we have the following
results. A separating equilibrium where i issues short-term debt and s issues
equity exists if gi is su¢ ciently high (other parameters being equal) and vi is
su¢ ciently low (close to vs).
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 3. Here gi = 1:5; vi = 1:6; i1 = 0:64; i2 =
0:96; b = 0:6 and  = 0:4. The gure shows under which values of gs and vs
separating equilibriums may exist. In the space below the thick line (A) the
separating equilibrium, where i plays debt and s plays equity, exists. In B the
separating equilibrium does not exist. Note that for any value of vs a separating
equilibrium exists if gs is low enough and for any gs a separating equilibrium
exists if vs is high enough. In other words a separating equilibrium exists if
asymmetric information about rate of earnings growth is more important than
that concerning the rmstotal values. Also note that a separating equilibrium
does not exist when gs = gi = 1:5 for any value of vs as was discussed in Section
3.1.
11Long mathematical expressions showing the cuto¤ value are omitted for brevity. Also
note that the corner solution condition when Rdsi > 0 for any value of  is given by substituting
 = 0 in (18) which is: s1=i1 + s2=i2  2. Its analysis is also omitted for brevity as well
as some corner conditions for following propositions because they do not add a lot of new
intuitions besides those described in the text.
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Figure 1. Separating equilibria with short-term debt and equity.
Finally we have the following result.
Proposition 4. A separating equilibrium where i issues long-term debt does
not exist.
By Lemma 1, the value of long-term debt corresponding to type i is lower
than that of type s and therefore if this type issues long-term debt it will be
mimicked by s.
4 Implications.
The analysis of this paper implies that when private information is two-dimensional
and contains information about rm value and the cash ow prole over time,
the choice between debt and equity may be used as a signaling device. A sepa-
rating equilibrium may exist where type i issues debt and type s issues equity.
This equilibrium has the following predictions:
(i) Firms issuing equity have lower operating performance in the long run
as compared to non-issuing rms (s2 < i2). This conclusion is conrmed
by empirical ndings for IPO rms (see, among others, Jain and Kini (1994),
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), Cai and Wei (1997), Mikkelson et al.
(1997) and Purnanandam and Swaminathian (2004)) and for SEO (seasoned
equity issues) rms (Loughran and Ritter, 1997).12 (ii) These rms have a
lower ratio of long-term earnings to short-term earnings as compared to non-
issuing rms (gs < gi). (iii) The absolute performance of rms issuing equity
exceeds the performance of non-issuing rms at the time of issue or in the near
future after issue (s1 > i1).13
Existing literature suggests few explanations for the long-term underper-
formance of rms issuing equity. Among basic rational market intuitions, the
12Note that in the context of our model, the non-equity-issuing rms are actually the ones
who issue debt. As Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) mention, and Eckbo and Norli (2001)
empirically conrm, issuing rms have lower leverage relative to non-issuing rms. This is
consistent with the idea that, unlike issuing rms, non-issuing rms prefer debt nancing.
13The empirical evidence on this point was discussed in the introduction.
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following theories are notable. The theory of agency cost of equity (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) underlines the idea that equity issues decrease the managers
stake in the company and reduce the incentive to undertake value maximizing
projects. This results in afterissuing underperformance of the rm, though the
theory does not compare the performance in the short run with that in the long
run after the issue. Also note that the link between afterissuing underperfor-
mance and a low managerial fraction of equity is empirically controversial. For
instance, Pagano et al. (1998), Cai and Loughran (1998) and Mickelson et al.
(1997) do not conrm the positive correlation between the fraction of insiders
equity and rm performance.
The trade-o¤ theory in its standard form, proposing that rms equalize the
marginal tax benets associated with additional debt to the marginal cost of
bankruptcy, suggests that more protable rms should issue more debt. How-
ever, it will not predict the link between debt-equity choice and dynamic prole
of performance after the issue (long-term performance versus short-term per-
formance). For instance, it will predict that type s (high expected performance
in the rst period) should issue more debt than i in the rst period in contrast
to our results. According to the free cash ow theory (Jensen, 1986) debt is
an instrument for solving the problem of a managers entrenchment and thus
more debt should lead to higher overall performance. However, this theory does
not give an explanation for why rms should issue equity. This theory would
also suggest that type s (with high expected performance in the rst period)
should issue debt in order to prevent managers from overspending. Recently
several dynamic versions of the trade-o¤ model were developed which combine
taxes, bankruptcy costs and di¤erent kinds of agency costs. Typically, these
models lead to less extreme and more realistic predictions than the basic ideas
do. However, we have not found a model which systematically analyzes the link
between debt-equity choice and dynamic prole of operating performance after
the issue. We will provide more discussion of dynamic trade-o¤ models later
when we discuss the correlation between debt and protability.
The market timing argument (see, for instance, Baker and Wurgler, 2002)
points out that while in Modigliani and Miller environment the capital structure
decisions are not a¤ected by the magnitude of share prices or by the hotness
of the market, in reality one observes that rms tend to issue equity when the
market prices are relatively high and do not issue equity when the prices are
relatively low. To relate this observation to the evidence about operating per-
formances, one line of the literature focuses on non-rational aspects of investors
behavior. For instance, some research argues that investors tend to be overopti-
mistic during new issues or that the analystsforecasts are inadequately high.14
The rms thus sell shares when they are overvalued or the rm is expected to
perform poorly compared to the price of the issue. Theo, Welch and Wong
(1998) argue that managers manipulate earnings (sacrice future earnings by
pushing up current earnings) prior to going public in order to attract more
non-informed investors. We share with this paper the idea that managers may
14For references see Ritter and Welch (2002) or Loughran and Ritter (1997).
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be involved in earnings management leading to their private information about
the timing of cash ows. However our framework assumes completely rational
investors which infer information about a rms earnings prole from observing
its nancing decision.15 The di¤erence between these two approaches (ratio-
nal market versus non-rational) is not only theoretical. Some recent empirical
research argues in favor of e¢ cient market version of the market timing argu-
ment (Schultz (2003) and Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005)) -pseudo-market
timing- where shares are not overpriced.
When investors are rational the prices are supposed to correctly reect rms
current and future earnings and not only current earnings. In such an environ-
ment and assuming that there is no asymmetric information or agency costs,
how can one explain that rst, rms time their issues and second, why the
rms issue shares when operating performance is high and why it becomes low
in the long run after issue? The literature based on rational investors is able
to argue why rms may be interested in issuing equity in periods when mar-
ket prices are high although it is not focused on explaining the link between
debt-equity choice and changes in operating performance after issue (long-term
versus short-term).16
Below we show that the separating equilibrium described in this paper is
consistent with market timing (or rather pseudo-market timing) empirical
evidence. In period 0 before the information about the rm type is acquired
by managers and before the nancing decision is made the market share price
equals p0 = (vi   2b)=n+ (1  )(vs   2b)=n, where  denotes the proportion
of rms of type i. After the managers of type s get information about earnings
they will realize that the true value of type s shares is (vs   2b)=n. Since the
market price will still remain the same because the investors do not know the
rms type the managers of type s will see their shares to be overvalued if  > 0:
p0 > (vs  2b)=n which follows from (16). They then issue equity. Investors will
infer correctly that equity is issued by type s. The price fall during the issue of
shares reects the well-known underpricing of newly issued shares phenomenon.
Also the second-period share price of type S (ps2) is lower than its rst-period
price.
Proposition 5. In a separating equilibrium where i issues debt and s issues
equity p0 > ps > ps2:
Note that the investors remain completely rational in our model and have
zero-prot in equilibrium.
Both the agency and trade-o¤ theory also provide insight into market timing.
According to the debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977) an excessive senior debt
15Steins (1989) model explains earnings ination in a rational world but it does not explic-
itly analyzes a debt-equity choice problem.
16 In addition to previously mentioned Lucas and McDonald (1990) note that in Berkovitch
and Narayanan (1993) rms can time their projects and the nancial market is imperfect
(there are switching rents imposed by intermediaries). Low-prot projects tend to be nanced
with equity and high-prot projects with debt. Firms will develop only the projects with
su¢ ciently high quality. In recession, only highly protable projects will be undertaken (with
debt nancing) and low-prot projects will be shelved until an expansion occurs. This paper
o¤ers an explanation for why more equity is issued during expansions.
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may lead the rm to forego some valuable investment opportunities. Thus, a
rm with high market value of shares and good investment opportunities respec-
tively will lose more from underinvestment and will thus issue equity instead.
However it is not straightforward to predict a link between equity issues and
subsequent operating performance consistent with observable evidence without
making additional assumptions about, for instance, the link between share price
and current operating performance.17 An advantage of the present paper com-
pared to Myers (1977) (and some other theories mentioned in this section) is
that it is not based on the link between protability and investment opportuni-
ties (for instance Jain and Kini (1994) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) do not
nd that afterissuing underperformance is due to the lower or higher amounts
of investment). In our model, all rms invest the same amount of funds and the
di¤erence comes only from future operating performance proles. Finally note
that Baker and Wrugler (2002) do not nd a lot of support for underinvestment
theory of market timing.
(iv) The model predicts that leverage is negatively correlated with protabil-
ity.18 To see this let us look at the dynamics of capital structure (in market
values) of both types of rms over two periods. Consider the basic model and
a separating equilibria where i issues short-term debt and s issues equity. In
period 1 (after the securities are issued until the earnings are received) the
debt/equity ratio of type s is 0 and that of type i is b=(vi   2b) (the denomi-
nator shows the market value of rms equity). It is clear that the debt/equity
ratio of type i is higher than that of type s while the opposite is true for average
earnings in the rst period. This conclusion does not change if one measures
debt/equity ratios at the end of rst period (after the earnings are received but
before second-period nancing decision is made). In the second period (after
the second-period nancing decision is made and before the second-period earn-
ings are received) the debt/equity ratio of type s is b=(s2  b) and that of type
i is b=(i2   b). We see that the debt/equity ratio of type s is higher because
s2 < i2 which conrms the negative correlation between debt and protability
in the second period as well.
Note that the trade-o¤ theory in its standard form is inconsistent with the
negative correlation between debt and protability because highly-protable
rms should tend to nance with debt in order to reduce their taxes. Hennessy
and Whited (2005) develop a dynamic trade-o¤ theory with the idea that a prof-
itable rm does not have to distribute its earnings immediately as the standard
models assume. This may reduce the incentive to reduce taxes by issuing debt.
The nancing decision depends on the next period nancing margin or what
the rm is going to do in the future: to issue more equity, to distribute more
earnings or to remain neutral. While providing a valid intuition about why the
static trade-o¤ may not work, the authors do not obtain a theoretical propo-
17 If one assumes that high current performance corresponds to the high share price then
it can explain point (ii). It will still be di¢ cult to explain why a rm issuing equity should
underperform in the long run after issuing equity and undertaking all its investment oppor-
tunities.
18See, for instance, Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995).
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sition about the link between debt and protability. However, they do show
numerically that under some plausible values of parameters one can observe the
negative correlation between debt and protability in their model.
Zwiebel (1996) develops a dynamic model of capital structure based on the
managersentrenchment argument. The paper suggests that when a rm has
more valuable investment opportunities the need to issue new debt as a dis-
ciplinary device decreases which leads to the situation where rms with lower
debt are likely to be more protable. While providing an idea about the nega-
tive correlation between debt and protability the paper does not explain why
rms issuing equity underperform in the long run. Also equity nancing is not
explicitly analyzed in the model.
Several empirical predictions which have not been tested in the literature
follow from Propositions 2 and 3. (v) Long-term operating underperformance
of rms issuing equity should more frequently be observed when reorganization
costs increase (Proposition 2); (vi) this phenomenon should more frequently
be observed when asymmetric information regarding the timing of cash ows
is larger than that regarding the total cash ows (Proposition 3). Possible
tests of these predictions will be based on identifying rms and industries with
high and low reorganization costs (bankruptcy cost). For industries with high
reorganization costs the underperformance of rms issuing equity should be a
more frequent phenomenon. One can also use the spread in analystsvaluations
of rmsshares as a proxy for the extent of asymmetric information regarding
the rmstotal values and the spread in the forecasts of future earnings (long-
term spread versus short-term spread) as a proxy for asymmetric information
about future rates of earnings growth. Also rms manipulating earnings prior
to issue (as in Theo and all, 1998) can be seen as ones with high degree of
asymmetric information about timing of earnings since earnings management
can often be seen as a redistribution of earnings between periods rather than
accounting fraud (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999).
Finally the model sheds some new light on possible motives for rms to use
such nancial instruments as dividend covenants, asset-backed securities and
non-recourse debt which we discuss in the next section.
5 The model extensions.
5.1. Long-term debt with dividend covenants. Long-term debt can be issued with
dividend covenants. The latter can establish maximal amount (Y ) of dividends
the rm is allowed to pay in the rst period. Intuitively a low Y makes payments
to creditors depend more heavily on the rst-period cash ow. This allows
type i to explore its informational advantage related to their low rst-period
performance. One can show that a separating equilibrium may exist where i
issues long-term debt with dividend covenants and s issues equity. The existence
of this equilibrium is negatively related to the extent of asymmetric information
regarding the rmsvalues and positively related to the extent of asymmetric
information regarding the rates of earnings growth conrming the ndings in
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basic model.
5.2. Mixed nancing. In this subsection we allow the rm to issue any
mix of di¤erent securities for nancing. Allowing mixed nancing provides little
usefulness for the analysis of operating performance of rms issuing equity versus
that of non-issuing rms. The reason is that most empirical literature on this
topic does not di¤erentiate issuers according to fractions of equity in capital
structure. Even a marginally small issue of shares puts a rm into the category
of issuing rms. Thus it will be hard to interpret the equilibrium in terms of
existing empirical evidence. However, allowing for mixed nancing is important
with regard to the conclusions about the negative correlation between debt and
protability and more interestingly about the conditions of existence of this
phenomena which constitute an addition to the literature on this phenomena.
Let
b = be + bd
where be and bd denote equity and debt (for simplicity of exposition we assume
that debt is short-term).19 Hence the rst-period nancing policy can be de-
scribed by, for instance, a variable be, 0  be  b. Note that be = 0 corresponds
to pure short-term debt nancing and be = b corresponds to pure equity nanc-
ing. Denote the entrepreneurs expected payo¤ if the type is k, strategy be is
played and the type is perceived by the market as m by Vkm(be).
The scenario when bd > 0 and rx1 = 0 is analogous to pure short-term debt
nancing. If V2  F1 the shareholders will o¤er the creditors a new claim with
the real value equal F1. This o¤er will be accepted because it is the best claim
the creditors can get if they appeal. If the real value of new claim is less than
F1 the court will force an increase in the value of the new claim. If V2 < F1 then
the shareholders will o¤er the creditors a fraction  of the rms equity. This
o¤er will be accepted because it is the best value the creditors can get through
bankruptcy and getting the control over the rm.
With mixed nancing, rms have a much greater degree of freedom than in
the basic model and thus the set of possible equilibriums becomes much larger.
More precisely each combination of initial parameters ' = (vi; gi; vs; gs; b; ) can
support several separating equilibrium, in most cases a continuum of equilibria.
We will denote an equilibrium as ;  2 (') where (') denotes the set of all
possible separating equilibriums when the exogenous parameters are given by
'. We will show however that in qualitative aspects the results are very similar
to those found in the basic model. First of all, Lemma 7 (see Appendix) shows
that the valuation of securities in this setting has a lot in common with pure
nancing scenarios. For instance, the share price depends only on the rms
total value and not on the rate of earnings growth. Secondly, we show that an
increase of debt in the capital structure of type i reduces the potential earnings
of s if it mimics i and conversely an increase of equity in the capital structure
of s reduces the potential payo¤ of i if it mimics s.
Lemma 8. @Vsi(be)=@be > 0; @Vis(be)=@be < 0:
Lemma 8 leads to the following result.
19This assumption is not crucial.
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Proposition 5. For each set of exogenous parameters ' there exist two
subsets of separating equilibriums 1 and 2;1 \2 = ?;1 [2 = (') such
that: 1) in any  2 1 i uses a higher fraction of debt nancing than s; 2)
an equilibrium  where i plays be and s plays b0e belongs to 2 if and only if
0 2 2 where 0 is a separating equilibrium where i plays b0e and s plays be:20
1 provides strong support for the results of the basic model about the
negative correlation between debt and protability. Firms issuing more equity
(type s) have lower leverage during the rst period and higher protability in
that period and vice versa in the second period. On the other hand, 2 is
irrelevant in predicting the link between debt and protability since on average
among all equilibriums in this set, type i has the same debt as type s. Thus, it
is similar to a pooling equilibrium situation which is not able to generate any
predictions of this kind.
Proposition 6. 1 is non-empty if and only if the conditions of propositions
2 and 3 hold.
Proposition 7 shows that the negative correlation between debt and prof-
itability is likely to exist when asymmetric information regarding the timing of
earnings is large and that about the rmstotal values is small.
5.3. Up-front nancing. If the rm is allowed to use up-front nancing, the
main results are not a¤ected. Suppose that in the rst period the rm issues
securities with a total value larger than b, then invests b in the rst stage and
keeps the rest for the second stage. Consider strategy e. One can show that
the share price still depends only on the rms total value. Thus the same
logic applies. If i uses up-front equity nancing in equilibrium then the second
period claims of type i will be overpriced if type s mimics type i in equilibrium.
Another problem with up-front nancing is that keeping cash can be costly for
the rm (Jensen, 1986).21
5.4. The case where short-term asymmetry is large and long-term asymmetry
is small. Here we discuss the case when condition (3) does not hold. In this
case a separating equilibrium may exist with s issuing debt and i issuing equity.
The reason is that i has a smaller total value than s and if this di¤erence is large
enough a separation may exist. We can show that if such an equilibrium exists
then there also exists an equilibrium where i issues debt and s issues equity.
Thus, debt issues by i will prevail (this is similar to subsection 5.2).
6 Conclusions
This paper examines optimal nancing in a dynamic setting (two-stage invest-
ment process) under asymmetric information. The analysis is based on the
idea that rms have private information about their earnings proles over time.
20Similar approach was used in Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995), proposition 3.
21The only case when up-front equity may be important is one where the rmstotal values
are exactly equal (see Miglo and Zenkevich, in press), keeping cash is not costly and the rm
is prohibited from distributing rst-period dividends. Then I will not be mimicked by S if it
plays up-front equity. This scenario is unrealistic.
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The focus is on the analysis of separating equilibria and the link between rms
operating performance and nancing strategies. It is shown that a separating
equilibrium exists where rms with a higher rate of earnings growth issue less
equity and more debt than rms with a stagnating prole. Thus, the model pre-
dicts that: 1) rms issuing equity underperform in the long run; 2) these rms
have superior performance in the near future after the issue and; 3) there is
a negative correlation between debt and protability. According to Ritter and
Welch (2002) long-term underperformance is one of the most intriguing phe-
nomena in corporate nance. This paper has brought forth some new results
which have not been tested in existing literature. Long-term operating under-
performance of rms issuing equity should be more frequently observed when:
1) reorganization costs increase (Proposition 2) and; 2) asymmetric information
regarding the timing of cash ows is larger than that regarding the total cash
ows (Proposition 3).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider strategy e played by type x; x 2 i; s. Denote
the dividend per share in period 1 when the cash ow is rx1 by d
rx1
x1 and the
total dividend in period 1 by Drx1x1 . Respectively d
rx1rx2
x2 and D
rx1rx2
x2 denote the
dividend per share (total dividend) paid in period 2 when rst-period earnings
are rx1 and second-period earnings are rx2. The following equations determine
the prices of issued securities:
1) budget constraint for equity issue:
b = pxnx (20)
2) market valuation of shares (share price equals the expected amount of
dividends per share):
px = Erx1 [d
r1
x1 + Erx2d
r1r2
x2 ] (21)
3) total dividend in period t:
Dr1x1 = d
r1
x1(n+nx) (22)
Dr1r2x2 = d
r1r2
x2 (n+nx) (23)
4) earnings distribution in period t:
Dr1x1 + f
r1
x = rx1 (24)
Drx1rx2x2 = maxfrx2   F rx1x2 ; 0g (25)
5) market valuation of second-period debt:
b  frx1x = Erx2 minfrx2; F rx1x2 g (26)
Substituting (22)-(25) into (21) produces:
px =
Erx1 [rx1   frx1x + Erx2 maxfrx2   F rx1x2 ; 0g]
n+nx
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Further using the identity maxfrx2   F rx1x2 ; 0g+minfrx2; F rx1x2 g = rx2 and (26)
we get:
px =
Erx1 [rx1   frx1x + Erx2 [rx2   (b  frx1x )]]
n+nx
=
x1 + x2   b
n+nx
This equation together with (20) produces:
px = (x1 + x2   2b)=n (27)
Also from (25):
F rx1x2 = (b  frx1x )=x2 (28)
Now consider strategy d. If rx1 = 0 then Vx2 = x2  b and V cx2 = (x2  b).
First consider the case
Fx1 > x2   b (29)
We have:
6) market valuation of rst-period debt:
b = Erx1 [minfrx1; Fx1g+  Pr(rx1 < Fx1)Erx2D0rx2x2 ] (30)
Equation (30) takes into account that if rst-period cash ow is not su¢ cient
to pay short-term debt the creditors get the fraction  of the rms equity.
7) market valuation of second-period debt:
b  frx1x = Erx2 minfrx2; F rx1x2 g (31)
Equation (30) can be written as
b = x1Fx1 + (1  x1)Erx2 maxfrx2   F 0x2; 0g (32)
Using (31), f0x = 0 and the identity:
maxfrx2   F rx1x2 ; 0g+minfrx2; F rx1x2 g = rx2
we get:
Erx2 maxfrx2   F 0x2; 0g = x2   b (33)
(32) and (33) imply
Fx1 =
b  (1  x1)(x2   b)
x1
(34)
(34) implies that if x2 < 2b, condition (29) holds. If x2  2b then Fx1 = b
(debt is risk-free). If rx1 = 0 then debt can be rolled over by issuing a new claim
with a face value F rx = b=x2. Since x2  2b the rm will be able to nance
the second stage by issuing a new claim with a face value F 0x2 = b=x2.
Strategy l. There is no default in t = 1. If long-term debt is junior then the
rm distributes as much cash in dividend as possible in t = 1 and borrows b in
the second period. Then we have:
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8) value of long-term debt:
b = Erx2 minfr^2; Fx2g (35)
where r^2 denotes the funds remaining after the payment to second-period debthold-
ers: r^2 = maxfrx2   F rx1x2 ; 0g. Also:
9) market valuation of second-period debt:
b = Erx2 minfrx2; F rx1x2 g (36)
Which implies: F rx1x2 = b=x2. (35) can be rewritten as b = x2(1   b=x2)
if 1   b=x2  Fx2 and b = x2Fx2 if 1   b=x2 > Fx2. The latter implies
Fx2 = b=x2 and x2 > 2b and the former gives x2 = 2b and Fx2  1=2. In
the latter case Fx2 does not matter as long as Fx2  1=2 (long-term creditors
capture all residual earnings after the payment to the second-period creditors)
and thus we can assume Fx2 = 1=2 = b=x2. Finally, strategy l is only possible
if x2  2b and Fx2 = b=x2.
If long-term debt is senior and x2  2b then we have 1  Fx2 + F 0x2 where
Fx2 = b=x2 and F 0x2 = b=x2. The debtholders payo¤ does not depend on
rst-period earnings (which will be distributed in total to the shareholders) but
only on second-period earnings. If rx2 = 1 they are paid in full, otherwise they
get nothing. If x2 < 2b then if rx1 = 0 the rm is not able to nance the
second stage externally and thus the entrepreneur o¤ers the creditors a claim
with a real value equal to 0. The creditors will accept the o¤er because if they
do not, they will not have a legal right to appeal in contrast to the short-term
debt scenario, and the rm will not nance the second stage. Finally if x2 < 2b
nancing with long-term debt is impossible.
Proof of Lemma 2. Obviously i1  s1 implies i2 > s2 by (1). By
Lemma 1, any claim issued by i has a higher value than that of type s; meaning
that s will always mimic i (if they play a di¤erent strategy) and a separating
equilibrium does not exist. Now s2  i2 implies s1 > i1 and we have the
same situation as above, except that now the roles are reversed: i mimics s.
End proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. If i1  s1 then by Lemma 2 a separating equilibrium
does not exist. Consider i1 < s1. Then, by the denition of g and from gi = gs
we have i2 < s2. By Lemma 2, a separating equilibrium does not exist. End
proof.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (2), (5), Lemma 1 and the following identity:
@Rekm
@vm
=
@Rekm
@m1
@m1
@vm
+
@Rekm
@m2
@m2
@vm
we get:
@Rekm
@vm
=
b
(vm   b)2 [k1(1  f
1
k + k2(1  F 1m2)) + (1  k1)k2(1  F 0m2)]+
+
m1k2gm(b  k1f1k )
(1 + gm)
2
m2
> 0
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(the rst term is strictly positive and the second term is non-negative because
k1f
1
k  f1k  b). The proof is analogous for the rest of the Lemma (all parts of
proofs, omitted for brevity, are available upon demand). End proof.
Proof of Lemma 4. Using (2), (5), Lemma 1 and the following identity:
@Rekm
@gm
=
@Rekm
@m1
@m1
@gm
+
@Rekm
@m2
@m2
@gm
we get: @R
e
km
@gm
=
m1vm(b k1f1k)
(1+gm)22m2
> 0
This is strictly positive because k1f1k  f1k  b and if k = i then by (14)
k1 = i1 < s1  1 and if k = s then f1k = f1s = 0. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists where
i plays equity. Then the following should hold:
Resi  0 (37)
Also:
Resi  Re(vs; gs; vi; gi; b; ) > Re(vs; gs; vs; gs; b; )  Ress = 0 (38)
This inequality follows from Lemmas 3 and 4, the continuity of Re(:), (15) and
(16). From (38) the condition (36) cannot be true. End proof.
Proof of Lemma 5. Since i2 < 2b we have from (6) and (7):
@Rdsi
@
=
(i2   b)(s1(1  i1)i2   i1s2(1  s1))
i1i2
This is positive by (14). End proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. Lemma 5 implies that three situations are possible.
1. There exists  2 [0; 1] such that Rdsi() = 0. Then let  = : Corollary
2 follows from Lemma 5.
2. Rdsi < 0 for any  2 [0; 1]. Then let  = 1:
3. Rdsi > 0 for any  2 [0; 1]. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that (19) holds by Lemmas 3 and 4. We
have
Reis  Re(vi; gi; vs; gs; b; ) < Re(vi; gi; vi; gi; b; )  Reii = 0
This inequality follows from Lemma 3 and 4, the continuity of Re(:), (15) and
(16). Secondly consider (18). By Corollary 2 it holds if and only if  exists
and   . End proof.
Proof of Lemma 6. Part 1. From (6) and (7) we have: @R
d
si
@gs
= vs(A+Bgs)(1+gs)3
where
A =
b(i2   i1)  (i2   b)((1  vs)i1 + (1  i1)i2)
i1i2
(39)
B =  (i2   b)(1 + vs)
i2
< 0 (40)
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(A and B are both independent of gs). From (1) and the denition of gs we
have: gs 2 [b; gi]. Three situations are possible.
1. b   A=B  gi. Then @R
d
si
@gs
 0 if  A=B > gs and @R
d
si
@gs
 0 if
 A=B < gs. Also Rdsi > 0 when gs = gi by Lemma 2 and (16). Then either
Rdsi > 0 for any gs or there exists g

s 2 [b; gi] such that Rdsi > 0 if and only if
gs < gs.
2. b >  A=B. Then @Rdsi@gs < 0 for any gs which implies (because Rdsi > 0
when gs = gi) that Rdsi > 0 for any gs.
3.  A=B > gi. Then @R
d
si
@gs
> 0 for any gs. Again either Rdsi  0 for any gs
or there exists gs 2 [b; gi] such that Rdsi > 0 if and only if gs < gs.
Part 2. From (6) we have:
@Rdsi
@vs
=
i2((i2   b)  b) + i1(i2   b)(s2   i2) + gsi1((i2   b)(s1   1)  b)
i1i2(1 + gs)
< 0
(the second term is obviously strictly negative and the rst term is strictly
negative because i2 < 2b,   1 and s2 < i2). The rest of lemma follows
from this inequality. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. From our previous proofs (19) holds. From the
rst part of Lemma 6, (18) holds if and only if gs  gs (other parameters being
equal). The second part of proposition 3 follows from the second part of Lemma
6. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that a separating equilibrium exists where i
plays long-term debt. From (14) and Lemma 1 the claims issued by type i have
higher value than the symmetric information value of claims issued by type s.
Thus s will mimic i. End proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Lemma 7. If information is symmetric then:
px = (x1 + x2   2b)=n = (rx   2b)=n
Fx1 =
 be (1 x1)(x2 b)
x1
; x2 < b+ be
b; x2  b+ be
F rx1x2 = (b  fr1x )=x2
F rx = (x2   b)=x2
Proof of Lemma 7 is omitted for brevity (similar to that of Lemma 1).
Proof of Lemma 8. If the rm is perceived by the market as type i then the
prices of securities are equal to the symmetric information prices for type i. If
bd > 0 and bd > i2   b then
Vsi(be) = i1[s1(1  Fi1 + s2(1  b=i2)) + (1  s1)(1  )s2(1  b=i2)]
where
i1 =
i1 + i2   2b
i1 + i2   2b+ be
24
Fi1 =
bd   (1  i1)(i2   b)
i1
Thus
@Vsi(be)
@be
=
(i2   b)(s1i2   i1s2   (s1i2(1  i1)  i1s2(1  s1))
i1i2
By (14), this expression attains its minimum when  = 1 and it is
(i2 b)s1(i2 s2)
i2
> 0. The proof is analogous for the second part. End
proof.
Lemma 9. If an equilibrium exists where i plays be and s plays b0e and
be > b
0
e then there is also an equilibrium where i plays b
0
e and s plays be:
Proof. Suppose that a separating equilibrium where i plays be and s plays
b0e exists and that be > b
0
e . If bd = b  be > 0 and i2   b  bd then by Lemma
7 all claims issued by type i have a higher value than those of type s and thus
a separating equilibrium is impossible. If bd = 0 then a separating equilibrium
does not exist (analogous to Proposition 4). We thus consider the case bd > 0
and i2  b < bd. Since no type has an incentive to mimic another type we have:
Vis(b
0
e)  i1 + i2   2b (41)
Vsi(be)  s1 + s2   2b (42)
By Lemma 8
Vsi(b
0
e)  Vsi(be) (43)
From (42) and (43) we have:
Vsi(b
0
e)  s1 + s2   2b (44)
Analogously we get
Vis(be)  i1 + i2   2b (45)
(44) and (45) prove the existence of equilibrium where i plays b0e and s plays be.
End proof.
Now we turn to the proof of Proposition 5. Let 1 contain all equilibriums
such as: 1) if i plays be and s plays b0e then be < b
0
e; 2) an equilibrium where
i plays b0e and s plays be does not exist. Let 2 contain all other separating
equilibriums. 1 obviously satises the conditions described in the proposition.
Now consider an equilibrium from 2 where i plays be and s plays b0e. If be < b
0
e
then from above there is also an equilibrium in 2 where i plays b0e and s plays
be which proves the proposition. The same is also true if be > b0e by Lemma 9.
End proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Su¢ ciency. It obviously follows from propositions 2
and 3: an equilibrium where i issues only debt and s issues only equity exists and
it belongs to 1. Necessity. Suppose that the conditions of propositions 2 and
3 do not hold and 1 is non-empty. Thus a separating equilibrium exists. Then
by Lemma 8 there also exists a separating equilibrium where i issues only debt
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and s issues only equity which contradicts the assumption that the conditions
of propositions 2 and 3 do not hold. End proof.
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